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5

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BOUNTIFUL CITY

)

Plaintiff/Respondent,

)

vs.

)

BARBARA MAREK,

)

Case No. 860278-CA

Defendant/Appella
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The above action was brought against Defendant

on January

31, 1986, for driving a motor vehicle with no Utah registration.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On April 18, 1986 Defendant was trie<b for the offense of
driving

a motor

vehicle with no Utah registration.

The trial

Court took the matter under advisement, and a judgment of guilt
and sentence was imposed on May 5, 1986.
District Court

affirmed

the judgment

On October 31, 1986 the
of the lower court

and

remanded the case for sentencing.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the Circuit Courtfs ruling
and the District Court's finding, as well as a denial of relief
sought by Appellant.

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The record indicates that on January 31, 1986, defendant was
cited
with

for driving a motor vehicle not registered
the laws of the State of Utah.

charging

in accordance

A formal

information

the Defendant with NO UTAH REGISTRATION was filed on

February 14, 1986.

The trial was set for April 18, 1986 and the

Defendant received notice of that date in court on February 24,
1986.

The Defendant made a demand for trial by jury on March 6,

1986.

That request was denied by the court.
On April 18, 1986 trial was held

Court, Bountiful Department.

in the Fourth

Circuit

Bountiful City Police Officer Carl

Krall was sworn and examined by the City Prosecutor.

Defendant

then had an opportunity to cross-examine the officer's testimony.
The defendant was advised of her right to testify.

The defense

called Richard Marek to testify, and he refused to swear to tell
the truth.
without

The court

the oath.

refused

to hear Mr. Marek's

testimony

The defendant then called Officer Krall to

testify, and then Mr. Marek agreed to affirm to tell the truth
and he testified for the defense.
The Court took the matter under advisement and rendered a
guilty judgment on May 5, 1986.

Defendant appealed to the Second

Judicial District Court, County of Davis, and on October 31, 1986
the District Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court and
remanded the case to the trial court for sentencing.

2

SOMMARY OF ARGDMENT
No deprivation of constitutional rights occurred where the
appellant was found guilty of violating a valid city ordinance.
Respondent Bountiful City has the right to legislate on the same
subject

as a state statute by an express grant of authority.

There is no inconsistency that would
ance.

invalidate the city ordin-

The fact that the city ordinance prescribes a smaller

penalty than the state statute on the same subject does not
invalidate

the municipal

law.

Rights

of the accused

to a

trial by jury were not available for violation of an infraction
which can not be punished by

imprisonment.

The constitutional argument regarding use of gold and silver
coin as the only tender in payment of debt is without merit.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THERE IS NO RIGHT TO A JDRY TRIAL FOR VIOLATION OF
AN INFRACTION WHICH IMPOSES NO INCARCERATION
A defendant is not entitled to a jury trial for violation of
a city ordinance which cannot be punished

by

incarceration.

Utah Code Ann. Section 78-4-19, (1953, as amended) provides as
follows:

"All criminal actions before a circuit court arising

under city ordinances shall be tried and determined without the
intervention of a jury, except in cases where imprisonment may be
made a part of the penalty."
A person convicted of an infraction may not be imprisoned, but may be subject

to a fine.

76-3-205, (1953 as amended).

Utah Code Ann. Section

The rights of an accused to a jury

trial are not violated where the offense is an infraction

not

punished by imprisonment.
The Bountiful City Traffic Code Section 8-2-104(a) which
charged the defendant with improper registration was an infraction.

The only penalty

for violation

Ordinance was payment of a fine.
to punishment by imprisonment.
available

to a defendant

of that Bountiful City

The appellant was never subject
The right to a jury trial is not

charged

with violation

of a

city

ordinance which does not provide for punishment by incarceration.
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POINT II
A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE IS VALID WHERE THE PENALTY
DOES NOT EXCEED THAT IMPOSED BY STATE LAW
Municipalities have the authority

to enact rules and

regulations consistent with the Traffic Rules and Regulations
Act. Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-16 (1953 as amended). Bountiful
City Traffic Code Section 8-2-104(a) is consistent with Utah Code
Ann. Section 41-1-18 regarding registration of vehicles.

"In

determining whether an ordinance is in ^conflict' with general
laws, the test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that
which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa...."
Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113,93 P2d 671f 673 (Utah 1938).
Adequate

legislative authority exists for Bountiful City's

enactment of Section 8-2-104(a) of the Bountiful City Traffic
Code.
In the present case the Bountiful City ordinance does not
permit action that the state statute prohibits.

The municipal

ordinance differs from the state regulation only in the area of
penalties prescribed for failure to register a motor vehicle.
The test for whether a municipal ordinance is repugnant to or in
conflict with state law is not whether it provides different
penalties for the same violation, but whether it permits something that the state statute forbids.

The only restriction on

municipal penalties that differ from st^te laws is that they
cannot exceed that of state law.

McQuillin, Municipal Corpora-

tions, Section 17.15, at page 326 (3rd ed. 1981).

5

The penalty

in the Bountiful City ordinance is less than

that imposed by the State.

The city ordinance is an infraction

with a fine as the only penalty, not to exceed

five hundred

dollars, the amount of fine for a class C misdemeanor.

The state

ordinance is a class B misdemeanor which imposes a fine of one
thousand dollars or six months in jail.

The court in Salt Lake

City v. Allred, 437 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1968) found nothing wrong
with allowing a local government to punish conduct as a misdemeanor which

is a felony at the state level.

Salt Lake City

v. Allred, cited with approval 37 Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, Section 165, p. 791, as follows:
A municipal ordinance is not in conflict with a statute
authorizing its adoption because of a difference in
penalties. Thus, further and additional penalties may
be imposed by statute, without creating inconsistency
and conversely, at least in some instances lesser
penalties may be imposed by the ordinance for violation
than by the statute without conflict.
Bountiful City had sufficient legislative authority to enact
an ordinance regarding registration of motor vehicles and

the

penalty involved could be less restrictive than the state statute
without being inconsistent.

The city ordinance is valid when it

relates to the same subject matter

as the state statute and

prescribes

information

because

a smaller

it charges

penalty.

The

the defendant with violation

is not

void

of a valid

ordinance, lawfully enforceable by the city.
Appellnt

urges that due to the lesser penalty the city

ordinance is invalid and violates the constitutional right to
equal protection.

As set forth

6

in Allred 437 P.2d

434, the

Bountiful

City

ordinance

which

lawfully enforceable by the city.

imposes

a lesser

Any assertion

penalty

is

of constitu-

tional violations based on validity of th£ ordinance is without
merit.
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CONCLUSION
The Bountiful City Ordinance regarding registration of motor
vehicles

is not in conflict with state statutes on the same

subject.

The city ordinance which prescribes a smaller penalty

than state laws on the same subject matter is valid.

No consti-

tutional violations of due process or equal protection occurred
where all proceedings were based on a valid city ordinance.
Circuit Court's

finding

of guilt

and

the District

The

Court's

affirmation of that judgment should be upheld.
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